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INTRODUCTION
In a sense, this Article is a throwback to an earlier era. Most of the ar-
ticles in this Issue use sophisticated techniques for uncovering the influence
of covert-and sometimes even unconscious-racial bias in capital cases.
The evidence of modem bias is often difficult to document and, even when
documented, still capable of racially neutral interpretations. In contrast, the
use of racial epithets is neither subtle nor ambiguous. In another sense,
however, this Article is not a throwback at all, for it reflects the continuing
legacy of the more hostile forms of bias that have not yet been eradicated
and that, as it turns out, our judicial system is not very enthusiastic about
eradicating.
The case of Curtis Osborne is emblematic both of the problem and of
the passive response of the criminal justice system. Osborne, an African
American, was convicted of capital murder in Georgia4 after being repre-
sented by attorney Johnny Mostiler, a long-time contract public defender.
Mostiler also represented Gerald Huey, a white man, on an unrelated
charge.' Although the only connection that the two clients shared was a
short and somewhat unfriendly stint in nearby isolation cells, Mostiler none-
theless discussed with Huey, in revolting terms, his representation of Os-
borne.6 Huey kept those discussions to himself until Osborne's case entered
federal court, and Huey began to believe that Osborne might be executed
without anyone knowing what he knew.7 At that point, Huey signed an affi-
4. Osborne v. Terry, 466 F.3d 1298, 1303-04 (11 th Cir. 2006).
5. Id at 1316.
6. Id.
7. Id.
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davit recalling Mostiler's use of racial slurs toward Osborne and complete
lack of interest in Osborne's welfare:
The first time I recall [Mostiler] saying anything about Curtis Osborne's case was
when he said, "The little niggerdeserves the death penalty." I was shocked be-
cause I knew that Mr. Osborne had not gone to trial yet[.] ... That wasn't the only
time [Mostiler] said something like that though. I recall [Mostiler] telling me that I
wouldn't believe the amount of money he was going to spend on my case. He said
he was going to hire a private investigator and get expert witnesses. He said the
money he would spend on m[e] was going to be a lot more than he would spend on
Mr. Osborne because "that little nigger deserves the chair." [Mostiler] made simi-
lar comments to me both before and after Mr. Osborne's trial.9
And indeed, just as he said, Mostiler did not expend available funding
on experts for Osborne, instead leaving the jury ignorant of the mitigating
mental illness that drove Osborne's crimes.'" Despite the fact that the state
never disputed that Osborne's lawyer made these statements, two state
courts and two federal courts denied relief, and the Supreme Court of the
United States denied review." The last substantive decision on the issue
came from the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which first found that the
claims relating to Mostiler's racial bias were procedurally defaulted because
they were raised in a second state post-conviction petition-because Os-
borne's Post-Conviction Relief (PCR) counsel did not know of the underly-
ing facts at the time of the first petition. 2 But the Eleventh Circuit went on
to reject the claim on the merits as well, for reasons that are noteworthy:
Assuming arguendo that the McCleskey claim is not procedurally barred from fed-
eral habeas review, we conclude that the claim lacks merit. Even if the affidavit
correctly recounts Mostiler's statements to Huey, it does not establish that Mostiler
failed to convey the plea offer to Osborne. Moreover, Osborne presents no other
evidence to support his claim that Mostiler's alleged racial animosity affected his
representation. Furthermore, McCleskey discusses the racial animus of the
decisionmakers, not defense counsel; therefore, Osborne's claim does not fit within
the McCleskey rubric.'
3
Thus, it appears that in the Eleventh Circuit: (1) using a racial slur to
describe his client and declare that the client deserves to be executed does
8. We debated whether or not to print out the epithets, realizing that every repeti-
tion causes some injury, but also believing that evasion of the ugliness of racial epithets is
part of what has allowed courts to affirm convictions. When one of us argued Curtis Os-
borne's case in the Eleventh Circuit, none of the three judges on the panel were willing to
repeat the slur in their questions-but all of them were willing to vote to affirm the convic-
tion. This is hypocrisy, to say the least. So we have opted in this Article to report the slur the
first time we describe the case, and then to avoid its repetition, acknowledging that this is not
a perfect solution.
9. Osborne, 466 F.3d 1298 (emphasis added).
10. Id.
11. Id. at 1317-18.
12. Id. at 1318.
13. Id.
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not affect the credibility of a lawyer's denial that he failed to convey a plea
offer of life imprisonment to his client (an offer that would have led to the
client escaping the "chair" that his lawyer thought he deserved); (2) stating
that he will not hire any experts for a client because the client deserves to
die-and then in fact not hiring any experts--does not constitute "evidence
... that [a lawyer's] racial animosity affected his representation;" and, most
surprising of all, (3) there is no constitutional prohibition against race-based
animus toward a client, even if that animus affected decisions made during
the course of representation. 4
Clemency proceedings were equally unavailing. Former President
Jimmy Carter made a plea for clemency, as did former U.S. Attorney Gen-
eral Griffin Bell." After a hearing that left no doubt that Mostiler in fact
used racial slurs to describe not only Osborne but other African-American
clients, the Georgia Board of Pardons and Parole denied clemency, and Os-
borne was executed in June of 2008.16
We encountered the case of Curtis Osborne as part of our work in the
Cornell Death Penalty Project; one of us represented him in the Eleventh
Circuit, on certiorari, and then in clemency proceedings. Then, in 2010, one
of us consulted with local post-conviction counsel for Johnny Bennett,
whose case also involves a racial epithet. 7 We postpone discussion of the
Bennett case, which is now pending before the South Carolina Supreme
Court, for Part I.8 But we note it here because prior to seeing this second
case, all three of us would have assumed that the use of a racial epithet at a
criminal trial would be rare. When we later examined that assumption, we
realized that such a broad phrasing overstated what we really expected. Tes-
timony in which a witness repeats a racial epithet used in some other setting
might or might not be terribly rare; the frequency of the use of racial epi-
thets during the course of a crime or its aftermath cannot be deterred by the
judicial process and generally would not reflect bias in that process. So to
be more precise, we would have thought that the use of an epithet by a
decisionmaker-a judge, lawyer, or juror-would be extremely rare. Be-
cause the Project was involved in two such cases in less than five years, we
wondered whether even that assumption was unduly optimistic. We all
agreed that we would also have assumed that the use of an epithet by any of
the decisionmakers would lead to reversal-but it did not in Osborne,'9 and
14. Id.
15. Georgia Murderer Executed, UPI.CoM, June 4, 2008, http://www.upi.com
/TopNews/2008/06/04/Georgia-murderer-executed/UPI-47271212636675/.
16. Id.
17. See discussion infra Subsection I.B. L.a.
18. See infra Subsection I.B. 1.a.
19. Osborne v. Terry, 476 F. 3d 1299, 1318 (11 th Cir. 2006).
Vol. 2011:755
Racial Epithets in the Criminal Process
so far, has not in Bennett.2" We all found preposterous every one of the rea-
sons cited by the reviewing courts as the basis for denying relief. This led us
to undertake to find all of the racial epithet cases of the last twenty years to
see how common they are and whether they typically result in relief
Part I reports the results of our collecting the cases. Part II describes
the general standards for assessing juror, judge, prosecutor, and defense
attorney misconduct that are applied to a variety of kinds of misconduct and
considers whether those standards are adequate when the misconduct in-
volves use of a racial epithet. Finally, Part III proposes how a judicial sys-
tem committed to racial equality would respond to racial epithets in criminal
cases.
I. MODERN RACIAL EPITHET CASES
The cases we found involving the use of racial epithets were surpris-
ingly numerous and, in general, unsuccessful. We initially searched for cas-
es from the past twenty years and, after discovering the numbers remained
fairly constant over the period, decided to concentrate on examples from the
past ten years. We summarize below seventeen cases: five in which the
criminal defendant nominally "won"'" and twelve where the defendant lost.
We spend the time to describe the facts and the courts' reasoning because
they vary and because, to our minds, they are a surprise to anyone who
thinks that old-fashioned racism has disappeared, or to anyone who thinks
that the courts are committed to eradicating it when it does appear. The first
subpart presents those cases in which a lower court's denial of relief was
reversed or vacated on appeal-the "wins"-although as will be explained,
only two of those "wins" were really victories, either for the defendant or
for racial equality. The second subpart discusses those cases in which the
defendant was denied relief. The third explains our strong suspicion that
these readily discoverable cases substantially underrepresent the universe of
recent cases in which a party to trial used racial epithets against a defendant.
A. "Winning" Cases: Epithets by Jurors
Perhaps the most surprising discovery-apart from how unreceptive
the courts have been in awarding relief for racial bias-about these cases is
that those in which a defendant succeeds on appeal have all involved juror
misconduct. In only two cases-neither of which were capital-was an epi-
thet the basis for remanding for a new trial; the other three cases granted
some form of relief to the defendant in the form of an ability to explore fur-
20. See discussion infra Subsection I.B. l.a.
21. Even though we denote these cases as wins, most are actually quite limited and
may not necessarily result in relief.
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ther facts about the claim, but under a legal standard likely to ultimately
defeat the claim.
1. State v. Jones
Jeffrey Jones was convicted under Louisiana law for possession of a
knife while also in possession of cocaine. 2 After the jury was impaneled but
before opening statements, a juror informed the court through a note-
which the juror wished to remain confidential-that, in the jury room, he
overheard another juror "[use] the term 'nigger,"' though not in specific
reference to Jones. 23 A long colloquy followed in which defense counsel
noted the all-white makeup of the jury panel and requested further voir dire
of the juror who used the racial epithet.24 In response, the prosecutor assert-
ed that the use of an "offensive term [did] not mean in any way whatsoever
that [the jury] cannot give [Jones] a fair trial. ' 25 The judge refused to permit
voir dire of the juror,26 and after the defendant was convicted, he asserted on
appeal that the trial court denied his right to trial by a fair and impartial ju-
ry.
27
The Court of Appeal of Louisiana reversed.28 It first noted two earlier
cases from other jurisdictions in which the use of similar epithets was the
basis of reversal: United States v. Heller,29 and Wright v. CTL Distribution
Inc,3" a civil case. Even though both of those cases presented situations in
which jurors used epithets in direct reference to the party, the Jones court
found that distinction unpersuasive, stating that it had "considerable diffi-
culty accepting the government's assumption that, at this time in our histo-
22. State v. Jones, 2009-0751, p. 2 (La. App. 1 Cir. 10/23/09); 29 So. 3d 533, 534.
23. Id. at p. 4; 29 So. 3d at 535.
24. Id. at p. 4; 29 So. 3d at 536.
25. Id. at p. 5; 29 So. 3d at 536.
26. To justify his decision, the judge first noted the difference between the present
case and "a capital case where you even have to go more in depth as to jury qualifications."
Id. p. 5; 29 So. 3d at 537. He also explained that, because the juror who wrote the note want-
ed to remain anonymous, raising the issue "would lose [that juror's] confidence and possibly
the confidence of all the jurors." Id. at p. 5; 29 So. 3d at 537. The judge did, however, agree
to include in his jury instruction a caution against being "influenced by sympathy, passion,
prejudice or public opinion." Id. p. 6; 29 So. 3d at 537.
27. Id. at p. 3; 29 So. 3d at 535.
28. Id. atp. 10-11; 29 So. 3dat540.
29. 785 F.2d 1524 (11 th Cir. 1986). In Heller, the Eleventh Circuit reversed a con-
viction where jurors used racial and ethnic slurs, at least some of which were directed at the
defendant. Id. at 1525.
30. 650 So. 2d 641 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995). In Wright, a civil action for negli-
gence stemming from a car accident, a juror informed the judge that she heard several mem-
bers of the jury say they would not "award anything to Wright because she was a fat black
woman on welfare who would simply blow the money on liquor, cigarettes, jai alai, bingo or
the dog track." Id. at 642.
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ry, people who use the word 'nigger' are not racially biased."'" The court
then held that a juror's use of the term, even when not directed at a party to
the proceeding, combined with limited effort on the part of the trial judge to
investigate or remedy the situation, shows such a high probability of preju-
dice that the trial is "inherently lacking in due process."3 As a result,
Jones's conviction and sentence were vacated, and the court remanded for a
new trial.33
2. People v. Rivera
Orlando Rivera was convicted by jury on two counts of burglary,
grand and petit larceny, and two counts of criminal mischief in Kings Coun-
ty, New York in 2000."4 In a posttrial motion to set aside his convictions
because of juror misconduct, Rivera presented the account of three jurors
that a fourth juror stated, "I know that nigger is guilty."35 Although Rivera
argued that this statement showed that he was denied his right to an impar-
tial jury, the trial court disagreed, denying his motion,36 but the Appellate
Division reversed. 7 The court acknowledged that although typically juror
misconduct warrants a new trial only when a defendant shows "prejudice to
a substantial right," the case is different "where a juror had an undisclosed
preexisting prejudice that would have resulted in his or her disqualification
if it had been revealed during voir dire, such as an undisclosed, pretrial
opinion of guilt against the defendant."38 Because of the juror's racist atti-
tude, the court reversed and ordered a new trial.39
3. Marshall v. State
Matthew Marshall was convicted and sentenced to death for murder of
a fellow inmate while imprisoned in Florida. ° Evidence of jurors' use of
racially charged language in Marshall's trial emerged when a juror in the
31. Jones, 2009-0751, at p. 8; 29 So. 3d at 539 (quoting United States v. Henley,
238 F.3d 1111, 1121 (9th Cir. 2001)).
32. Id. p. 10; 29 So. 3d at 540.
33. Id.
34. People v. Rivera, 759 N.Y.S.2d 136, 137 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003).
35. Id. There was some disagreement about the precise timing of the juror's use of
the slur, two jurors asserting that they overheard it during trial deliberations and another
stating that he overheard it during juror selection. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Marshall v. State, 854 So. 2d 1235, 1237 (Fla. 2003) (per curiam).
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case called Marshall's attorney4 and told him that: (1) jurors told racial
jokes about Marshall and (2) some jurors announced during the guilt phase
that they would vote for guilt and a "life sentence because they wanted Mar-
shall to return to prison to kill more black inmates."42 The trial court barred
introduction of this evidence during post-conviction proceedings on the
grounds that it inhered in the verdict and was therefore barred by state stat-
ute.43
The Florida Supreme Court reversed the trial court's ruling that the
evidence of bias inhered in the verdict, finding that racial bias constitutes an
overt act of conduct that does not "inhere[] in the verdict." Consequently,
the court remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the claim of juror bias,
giving the trial court explicit instruction on how to proceed.4" First, the trial
court was to determine the identity of the female juror who spoke to Mar-
shall's attorney on the phone,46 and from there, if the court determined there
existed a reasonable probability of juror misconduct, it was to conduct fur-
ther interviews.47 Although Marshall does not order a new trial, the terms of
its remand put it in line with Jones and Rivera, for it states clearly that relief
would be warranted were the allegations proven, because "when appeals to
racial bias are made openly among the jurors, they constitute overt acts of
misconduct" and therefore are outside the rule against inquiry into conduct
that "inhered in the verdict."'48
Jones, Rivera, and Marshall are, however, the only reported cases in
this century that vindicate the premise with which we started: that the use of
a racial epithet by a trial participant, such as a judge, juror, or lawyer,
should be-and would be-reversed.49 The other two "wins" are far more
limited victories, if they are victories at all. They are focused on vindicating
the interest in prohibiting lying on voir dire, rather than on redressing racial
bias.
41. Although counsel remembered that the caller was a female, he could not re-
member the caller's name. Id. at 1239.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1240; see Fla. Stat. § 90.607(2)(b) (1999).
44. Marshall, 854 So. 2d at 1241-42.
45. Id. at 1253.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1241 (quoting Powell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 652 So. 2d 354, 357 (Fla. 1995))
(emphasis omitted).
49. State v. Jones, 2009-0751 (La. App. I Cir. 10/23/09); 29 So. 3d 533; People v.
Rivera, 759 N.Y.S.2d 136, 137-38 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003); Marshall, 854 So. 2d at 1237-44.
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4. United States v. Henley
Rex Henley stood trial with six codefendants for conspiracy to distrib-
ute cocaine and possession with intent to distribute cocaine." While the trial
was in progress in federal district court, a former juror in the case, Michael
Malachowski-who was excused for reasons unrelated to any misconduct-
approached Henley at his home and informed him that he had information
that could entitle Henley to a new trial, if Henley was convicted.5' Eight
days later, five of the charged individuals were convicted, including Hen-
ley. 2 Malachowski then provided Henley's counsel with a statement detail-
ing the extent of racist remarks made by juror Sean O'Reilly. 3
Malachowski swore that while carpooling with juror O'Reilly to the
trial, he heard O'Reilly say, "All the niggers should hang."54 According to
Malachowski, although O'Reilly had used the racial epithet, he did not ap-
pear to be directing it toward any of the defendants.55 Upon further investi-
gation, a fellow juror who carpooled with Malachowski and O'Reilly stated
that he also had heard O'Reilly say either "'The niggers are guilty' or 'Nig-
gers are guilty."' 56 Nonetheless, the trial court denied the defense motion for
a new trial. 7 The court partially based its denial on Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 606(b), which generally bars the use of a juror's testimony to im-
peach the jury verdict. 8
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit did not reach the question of whether
Rule 606(b) applies to proof that racial bias infected jury deliberations. In-
stead, it held that "[w]here ... a juror has been asked direct questions about
racial bias during voir dire, and has sworn that racial bias would play no
part in his deliberations, evidence of that juror's alleged racial bias is indis-
putably admissible for the purpose of determining whether the juror's re-
sponses were truthful."59 Whether the defendant was entitled to relief, ac-
cording to the Ninth Circuit, would turn on whether O'Reilly made state-
ments during voir dire which were untruthful-an inquiry not explored by
the trial court. The Ninth Circuit therefore remanded the case to the trial
50. United States v. Henley, 238 F.3d 1111, 1112 (9th Cir. 2001).
51. Id. Relevantly, the juror had information that juror Sean "O'Reilly had made
racist remarks," though he did not elaborate as to the precise statements until later. See id. at
1112-13.
52. Id. at 1112.
53. Id. at 1113.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1114.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1114 & n.4.
59. Id. at 1121 (citing Hard v. Burlington N. R.R., 812 F.2d 482, 485 (9th Cir.
1987)).
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court to "enter detailed findings and make a specific determination regard-
ing O'Reilly's alleged statements and racial bias."60
Although the last reported opinion in Henley is a "win," it foreshad-
ows the grounds on which other cases lose. It is possible, of course, that
when remanded, the trial judge would find that O'Reilly was lying, either
because he would admit to lying or because the judge would determine that
his demeanor betrayed his mendacity. However, the first possibility seems
little more than abstract, since a juror would likely be afraid to admit to ly-
ing on voir dire, even if he were conscious of doing so. And the second pos-
sibility, that the judge would find him to be lying, seems unlikely given his
initial hostility to this claim.
5. Williams v. Price
Ronald Williams was convicted of murder and sentenced to life im-
prisonment in Pennsylvania.6" His race-related claim in post-conviction
stemmed from the affidavits of two jurors who claimed to have observed, or
been targets of, the use of racial epithets. Juror Judith Montgomery swore in
an affidavit that she "was called 'a nigger lover' and other derogatory
names by other members of the jury" and heard other jurors say that the
defendant's "'black ass was cooked."' 62 Additionally, Jewel Hayes, an ac-
quaintance of Williams who attended the trial, supplied another affidavit
swearing that after the trial she heard a juror on the case state, "'All niggers
do is cause trouble."' 63 The post-conviction court denied relief on the
grounds that the affidavits served to impeach the verdict and were thus
barred from admission, an analysis that was affirmed through the state ap-
peals process.'
On appeal to the Third Circuit, that court explained the history and
justification of the "no impeachment" rule,65 then held that the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) precluded relief because
the state court's refusal to consider Montgomery's affidavit was not contra-
ry to or an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court
precedent.66 However, the "no impeachment" rule has never extended to
nonjurors, and because Hayes was not a juror, her affidavit should have
been considered. 67 The court therefore ordered a remand, but the remand,
60. Id. at 1122.
61. Williams v. Price, 343 F.3d 223, 225 (3d Cir. 2003).
62. Id. at 227.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 228.
65. See id. at 232-33.
66. See id. at 237 (citing Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2000)).
67. Id. at 233-34.
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like that in Henley, was limited to consideration of (1) whether the juror
failed to honestly answer a material question on voir dire and (2) whether a
truthful response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for
cause.
68
B. Losing Cases
Far more abundant are those cases in which racial epithets are used to
characterize and degrade a defendant-but no relief is granted. We group
them below by speaker: juror, defense lawyer, witness, and prosecutor.
1. Epithets by Jurors
a. State v. Bennett
In a post-conviction interview, one of Johnny Bennett's jurors, when
asked why he thought Bennett had committed murder, casually responded
that it was "'because he was just a dumb nigger."' 69 Somewhat surprisingly,
at the evidentiary hearing a year later, this juror did not deny making the
remark and admitted that he used the epithet "nigger" and the phrase "dumb
nigger" to describe other African Americans.7° He did acknowledge that he
was sorry he had uttered the word, but only because it caused him inconven-
ience seven years after the trial and he feared that he had "throw[n] another
wrench" in the case.7'
These admissions did not prompt the order of a new trial, at least not
from the PCR court. The PCR judge asked the state to draft an order deny-
ing relief, which he signed without modification. 72 That order first found
that there was no evidence that the juror had lied on voir dire,73 then justi-
fied the denial of relief on three theories: (1) that the juror's bias came into
existence sometime after the trial,74 (2) that the use of the slur did not estab-
lish that the juror believed that "African Americans were inferior to
Whites,"75 and (3) that the juror's racial prejudice was not relevant because
68. See id. at 229 (citing McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S.
548, 556 (1984)), 239.
69. Transcript of Record at 9, Bennett v. State, No. 06-CP-40-5751 (S.C. Ct. Com.
Pl. 2008).
70. See id. at 20.
71. Id. at 13.
72. Conversation with Robert Lominack, counsel for Johnny Bennett (Jan. 2011).
73. Amended Order at 36-37, Bennett v. State, No. 06-CP-32-3221 (S.C. Ct. Com.
Pl. 2009).
74. Id. at 40 ("[It is unclear from [the juror's] testimony when he came to the con-
clusion that the Applicant was a racial epithet.").
75. Id. at 42 (finding that the racist epithet "was a poor choice of words").
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the victim was also black.76 The case is currently pending review in the
South Carolina Supreme Court.
b. Pace v. State
Levi Pace was convicted of felony murder in Alabama in 2002 and
sentenced to life imprisonment.77 On his first appeal from a denial of his
motion for a new trial, Pace presented one juror's statement that another
juror used a racial slur to disparage the testimony of two African-American
defense witnesses, saying, "'I don't believe a word those niggers said."' 78
The appellate court remanded to conduct an evidentiary hearing on this
claim of juror bias,79 and on remand, the trial court found the juror who de-
nied making the statement more credible than his accuser.80 The reviewing
court deferred to the trial court's credibility determination,8 which of course
may have been correct. What makes this case interesting is the court's ex-
planation of why the claim would have been denied on the merits even if the
allegation had been credible." According to the court,
The testimony of [the two African-American defense witnesses], to the extent it
was elicited to discredit [the state's witness], likely had little impact on the jury,
because . . . [the state's witness's] testimony was far more damaging to her own
credibility than the testimony of [the two African-American defense witnesses']
was, so [the jurors'] refusal to consider [the two African-American defense wit-
nesses'] testimony would have been harmless.83
This explanation, of course, ignores the possibility that a juror who
used the epithet about a witness might have biased views concerning the
defendant.
c. Rouse v. Lee
Kenneth Rouse was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to
death in North Carolina.84 Rouse asserted on his initial state post-conviction
petition that a member of his jury had admitted he had intentionally con-
cealed the circumstances of his own mother's violent death at the hands of a
76. Id. at 44 (finding that even if the juror "possessed some racial prejudice," there
is no evidence that this bias would influence him in a case that involved a black victim).
77, Pace v. State, 904 So. 2d 331, 336-37 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004).
78, Id. at 342.
79, Id.
80, Id
81. Id.
82. Id. at 343 (explaining that "[elven had Pace been able to establish that [the juror]
was prejudiced against blacks, Pace would not have been denied a fair trial" because the
testimony of those African-American witnesses "likely had little impact on the jury").
83. Id.
84. Rouse v. Lee, 339 F.3d 238, 241 (4th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
Vol. 2011:755
Racial Epithets in the Criminal Process
criminal who was later executed for the crimes.85 That juror also allegedly
"expressed intense racial prejudice against African Americans, calling them
'niggers' and opining that [they] care less about life than white people do
and that African-American men rape white women in order to brag to their
friends."86 Nonetheless, the state court denied a hearing on his claim.87
Rouse's federal habeas petition was filed one day late.88 A Fourth Cir-
cuit panel had granted equitable tolling, relying on the short delay, the fact
that the mistake was made by attorneys over which Rouse himself had no
control, and the strength of Rouse's claim.89 The Fourth Circuit, sitting en
banc, reversed, declaring without even mentioning the juror's use of a racial
epithet, that the merits of Rouse's claim were irrelevant to the question of
tolling.9" Indeed, it is only by reading the dissent that one learns of the sub-
stance of Rouse's claim.91
d. State v. Bowens
Tyreese Bowens was convicted of murder committed at a Connecticut
convenience store.92 Bowens claimed that he was denied his right to a fair
trial due to the removal of an alternate juror, who had informed the court of
racially biased remarks said by a fellow juror. The alternate swore that: (1)
at lunch, the juror "said that she had been very uncomfortable because of all
the niggers that were there [at Burger King]"; (2) while discussing families,
the juror stated that she would not let her son shop where he wanted because
"all the people from the jungles were there"; and (3) the juror stated,
"[T]hank God I don't have to deal with the gangs" because "[I] liv[e] on the
good side" of town.93
The juror vehemently denied ever using racial epithets, referring to the
jungle, or referencing gangs,94 but several other jurors recalled hearing some
variation of those comments from the juror in question, though they stated
they did not interpret them as racist in nature. 95 Defense counsel moved for
85. Id. at 257 (Motz, J., dissenting).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 257-58.
88. Id. at 257 (majority opinion). On February 5, 1999, his state post-conviction
proceedings ended when the Supreme Court of North Carolina denied review of his claim
thus starting the one-year limitations period for filing for habeas relief in federal court. Id. at
244. Because February 5, 2000, was on a Saturday, Rouse had until the following Monday,
February 7, to file, but his lawyers miscalculated, and filed on February 8. Id.
89. Id. at 243.
90. Id. at 251.
91. See id. at 257 (Motz, J., dissenting).
92. State v. Bowens, 773 A.2d 977, 979, 980 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001).
93. Id. at 980 n.3.
94. Id. at 980 n.4.
95. Id. at 981.
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a mistrial, but instead, the court excused both the juror and the alternate.96
On appeal, the court did not find an abuse of discretion, noting that a trial
court has "wide discretion in determining the competency to serve."97 This
resolution, of course, ignored possible effects on the jurors who heard the
comments-and saw both the speaker and the whistleblower removed.
2. Epithets by Defense Counsel
There are five cases in the last ten years in which a claim for relief
based upon the defense attorney's use of a racial slur failed, and none in
which such a claim succeeded. Interestingly, in the previous decade, there
was only one such case reported, and relief was granted in that case.98 One
case, that of Curtis Osborne, is described at some length in the introduction.
The other four are no less discouraging.
a. Mayfield v. Woodford
Demetrie Mayfield was convicted of a 1983 murder and sentenced to
death in California, represented at trial by Donald Ames.99 He sought habeas
relief on the ground that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel
due to his attorney's conflict of interest-namely, that counsel was racially
prejudiced and, as a result, did not request the funding necessary for a suc-
cessful defense." ° Mayfield presented evidence that Ames was racially
prejudiced, including two specific declarations identifying "racial epithets
that Ames used in reference to minority clients." '' The declarations con-
veyed the following information:
Ames' former secretary states that he "consistently" referred to his African-
American clients as "niggers"; called another secretary "a dumb nigger"; and
called a fellow lawyer "a big black nigger trying to be a white man." Another for-
mer employee avers that Ames "said because his client [not Mayfield] was black
he, Ames, did not trust him and did not care what happened to him." An employee
of the superior court says in her affidavit, that Ames described a former secretary
as a "dumb little nigger" and that he said of a minority death penalty client (not
Mayfield) that "he deserves to fry." An investigator states that Ames referred to yet
another African-American client as a "dumb nigger."'
0 2
96. ld. at 981-82.
97. Id. at 982 (quoting State v. Mills, 748 A.2d 891 (2000)).
98. Frazer v. United States, 18 F.3d 778, 783 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding that where
trial counsel in a bank robbery case called his client "a stupid nigger son of a bitch," preju-
dice is presumed).
99. Mayfield v. Woodford, 270 F.3d 915, 918-19 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc).
100. See id. at 924-25.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 940 (Graber, J., dissenting in part).
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Despite, or perhaps because of, the repetitive use of this slur by de-
fense counsel, as confirmed by multiple sources, the court took pains to
minimize those repetitions by noting that none of the declarations related to
epithets used against Mayfield."3 The court did not consider the possibil-
ity-indeed, the likelihood-that a person who so "consistently" referred to
his African-American clients in this way also used it to refer to Mayfield.
Because Mayfield asserted that his counsel labored under a conflict of
interest, the court identified the controlling standard as Cuyler v. Sullivan,"°4
requiring "an actual conflict of interest [that] adversely affected his lawyer's
performance."'05 However, it also explained that the claim of racial bias is
not necessarily cognizable under the then-existing conflict-of-interest law.'0 6
Perhaps more importantly, the court found fatal the fact that Mayfield did
not demonstrate that his attorney performed deficiently because of his racial
bias.'l 7 Accordingly, it declined to even grant a Certificate of Appealability
on this claim."8
b. Ellis v. Harrison
Ezzard Ellis was convicted of murder in 1991 in California and sen-
tenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole;0 9 like
Demetrie Mayfield, whose case is described above, Ellis was represented at
trial by attorney Donald Ames."' In early 1996, the California Supreme
Court denied Ellis final review,"' but in 2005, after Ellis became aware of
Ames's prior representation of Mayfield '2 and the related allegations of
racial bias, he then submitted a habeas petition in federal court asserting that
Ames provided ineffective assistance, based on a conflict of interest.'
103. Id. at 925 (majority opinion).
104. 446 U.S. 335 (1980).
105. Mayfield, 270 F.3d at 925 (quoting Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 348).
106. See id. at 935 (Gould, J., concurring) & n.9.
107. Id. at 933 (majority opinion).
108. See id. (declining to grant a Certificate of Appealability for the claim). Mayfield
was, however, granted relief on his claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel
during the sentencing phase of his trial and awarded a new sentencing. See id. This may be
another instance of a court refusing to grant relief based upon a claim of racial bias, but
becoming more inclined to grant relief on another ground due to disturbing evidence that
racism was a contributing factor in a death sentence. See Sheri Lynn Johnson, Litigating for
Racial Fairness After McCleskey v. Kemp, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 178 (2007).
109. Ellis v. Harrison, No. EDCV 05-00520-SJO (MAN), 2010 U.S. Dist LEXIS
87560, at *5 (C.D. Cal. July 12, 2010) (magistrate findings), adopted, 2010 U.S. Dist LEXIS
87516 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2010).
110. Id. at *8-9.
111. Id. at "7.
112. See supra Subsection I.B.2.a.
113. As possible adverse effects of this conflict, Ellis cited Ames's failure to (1)
"challenge the jury panel in which African-American jurors were underrepresented," (2)
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The main obstacle facing Ellis was the length of time he had waited in
presenting his claim."4 Ellis asserted that his petition was timely because he
had only discovered that his attorney was a racist in 2003 after hearing
about the allegations in Mayfield's case.' '5 The court assented to the conten-
tion that a delayed commencement date for purposes of the limitations peri-
od was possible," 6 beginning when Ellis "first learned of Ames's possible
racism.""' 7 That determination was of no avail, however, because Ellis's
petition was filed on May 31, 2005-almost two years after Ellis learned of
the information underlying the accusations of Ames's racism."8 As a result,
the court dismissed Ellis's petition as untimely."9
c. Jones v. Campbell
Aaron Lee Jones was found guilty of capital murder and sentenced to
death in Alabama in 1982.121 In federal habeas litigation, Jones made a new
assertion that he was deprived of the effective assistance of trial counsel
because of attorney George Boles's racial animus.'2' Jones presented evi-
dence from his post-conviction counsel's legal secretary that Boles told her
on the phone "something to the effect of 'that nigger is going to fry."" 22 The
Eleventh Circuit, however, was not receptive to Jones's claim for relief.
First, the court explained that Jones's assertion was not a "claim" of
ineffective assistance because of how little discussion-if any-it received
in his federal petition and in the state courts. Regarding the petition, Jones
mentioned the claim only in the introduction and conclusions of his state
and federal petitions, never stating it as an explicit claim for relief. 23 Fur-
thermore, the Eleventh Circuit found that the state courts' failure to discuss
the racial bias allegation indicated that it was not a properly presented claim
object to racial discrimination in jury selection, (3) "challenge biased jurors, and" (4) "pre-
sent critical testimony." Ellis, 2010 U.S. Dist LEXIS 87560, at *10.
114. The typical limitations period for filing a federal habeas petition is one year,
which is tolled statutorily by the proper filing of post-conviction collateral review. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(d)(1) (2006). Relevant here, the one-year limitations period for a claim with a newly
discovered factual predicate begins upon discovery of that fact, provided there is delayed
discovery of those facts and that delay is excusable. Id. § 2244(d)(1)(D).
115. Ellis, 2010 U.S. Dist LEXIS 87560, at *8-9.
116. Id. at *36.
117. Id. at *29.
118. Id. at *12.
119. Id.
120. Jones v. Campbell, 436 F.3d 1285, 1291 (11 th Cir. 2006).
121. Id. at 1292.
122. Id. at 1304.
123. Id. The court also found unavailing the discussion of that bias during Jones's
evidentiary hearing as well as its inclusion in Jones's proposed findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law after the evidentiary hearing was held. Id.
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for relief'24 Because the claim was never presented to state courts for adju-
dication, it was procedurally defaulted, and Jones was denied relief because
he did not attempt to overcome the default. 5
The Jones court went on to explain that even if the allegation of racial
bias were cognizable on federal habeas, it would deny relief on the merits,
in a paragraph that cites three seemingly irrelevant facts:
Assuming the issue was properly before us for consideration, we would conclude
that the claim is without merit. Boles's alleged racial remarks occurred almost 13
years after Jones's trial. Jones did not present any evidence that Boles made any
racist statements to Jones during his representation. There is no evidence that Boles
ever made a derogatory racial remark to Jones. The alleged racial remark was made
to a legal secretary, not to Jones, and the alleged comment was made after Boles's
representation of Jones. There is no evidence to support Jones's allegation that
Boles's alleged racist attitude toward him affected Boles's representation to the ex-
tent that Jones was denied the right to counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amend-
ment. Accordingly, Jones is not entitled to relief on this claim.
126
Thus, the panel would have one assume that Boles somehow became
racially prejudiced against Jones after Jones's trial was over; it would have
one assume that the problem is in using the word to a client, who might-
unreasonably?-be offended, rather than the problem being that the lawyer
harbors racial animosity toward his client; and finally, it would have one
assume saying about one's client that "that nigger is going to fry" is not,
itself, evidence that his representation of the client would be affected.
d. State v. Yarborough
Kevin Yarbrough was convicted of murder in Ohio in 1997 and sen-
tenced to death.'27 He sought relief on grounds that his trial counsel had
rendered ineffective assistance because he breached the duty of loyalty to
his client. At the outset of trial, counsel engaged the help of a mitigation
expert to help prepare for trial and sentencing. In post-conviction proceed-
ings, the mitigation expert signed an affidavit stating that counsel had told
her, after the conclusion of trial, "that he [counsel] knew black people he
liked, but that Kevin was a nigger."'28 The mitigation expert pointed out
"that trial counsel did not follow her suggestions or advice during the penal-
ty phase of the trial."'29
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1304-05.
127. State v. Yarbrough, No. 17-2000-10, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 1930, at *3 (Ohio
Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2001).
128. Id.at*15-16.
129. ld.at "16.
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The court's discussion of Yarbrough's claim was extremely limited. It
conceded that such a statement, if made, was "grossly inappropriate, offen-
sive, and distasteful."' 3° However, the court explained that after a review of
the record, they could not find that trial counsel rendered ineffective assis-
tance in his performance.' 3 ' According to the court, the remark, if made, did
not prejudice the outcome of trial, and therefore no relief was warranted. 13 2
3. Epithets by Witnesses
a. Robinson v. State
Terik Robinson's capital murder trial was still, at the jury-selection
stage when he was confronted with a bizarre situation. The trial witnesses
were entering the courtroom when Avery Savage, a prosecution witness,
audibly blurted out an insult at Robinson that he was "a ho ass nigger."
'133
Defense counsel moved for a mistrial.'34 Rather than ruling on the motion,
the judge took Savage into custody, admonished him for the behavior, and
asked the jurors if the use of that offensive epithet would alter any of their
abilities to judge the case fairly and impartially. 35 All prospective jurors
responded that it would not, and voir dire resumed, with the judge never
having ruled on the defense's motion for a mistrial. 136
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arkansas found that it was procedur-
ally barred from considering the merits of Robinson's claim that the trial
judge should have granted a mistrial.'37 Specifically, the court explained that
the objection was not properly preserved on appeal because the trial judge
never ruled on it and defense counsel never followed up with questions
seeking an explicit ruling.'38 The court went on, however, to imply that even
if the issue had been preserved, the admonishment to the jury would have
sufficed to cure any prejudice resulting from the slur directed at Robin-
son.139 Consequently, the court denied Robinson all relief.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Robinson v. State, 214 S.W.3d 840, 842 (Ark. 2005).
134. Id
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 842-43.
139. See id. at 843 ("An admonishment is an acknowledged means of curing error.").
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4. Epithets by Prosecutors
Because we found only one case involving the use of racial epithets by
prosecutors in the last decade, we report it and two cases from the late
1990s.
a. Bennett v. South Carolina
During the sentencing phase of his trial, the prosecution emphasized
Johnny Bennett's race, pointing out his prior relationship with a white
woman and referring to him with what we consider two racial epithets:
"King Kong" and "Caveman."'4 ° The state supreme court was not troubled,
admitting that though these characterizations might have "racial connota-
tions," they were not an appeal to the passions and prejudice of the jury:
In this regard, the Solicitor's use of the term "King Kong" was not suggestive of a
giant black gorilla who abducts a white woman, but rather, descriptive of Appel-
lant's size and strength as they related to his past crimes.
141
To us, this decision seemed remarkably blind; we do not live in a
country where ape imagery is devoid of racial meaning, 4 and indeed "ape"
is itself a recognized racial slur.4 3 But the South Carolina Supreme Court's
complacency is easily trumped by that of the post-conviction court, as dis-
cussed above, for Johnny Bennett's capital jury included a juror who de-
scribed him as "just a dumb nigger." Perhaps twelve racially neutral South
Carolina jurors could have ignored these racially inflammatory comments,
but Johnny Bennett's jury clearly was not composed of twelve such people.
b. Nevius v. Sumner
After being convicted of capital murder in Nevada, Thomas Nevius
took a long trip through the state and federal courts, asserting many bases
for relief along the way. He first raised a claim concerning the prosecutor's
racial bias in federal habeas, claiming that he was entitled to discovery as to
whether "the prosecutor had made [a] statement [to defense counsel] about
not wanting 'all those niggers on [his] jury.""' Even after one of Nevius's
140. Bennett v. State, 632 S.E.2d 281, 285 (S.C. 2006).
141. ldat288.
142. See, e.g., Jennifer Eberhardt, Not Yet Human: Implicit Knowledge, Historical
Dehumanization, and Contemporary Consequences, 94 J. PERSONALITY AND Soc. PSYCHOL.
292 (2008).
143. List of Ethnic Slurs, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List of ethnic
slurs (last visited Oct. 20, 2011).
144. Nevius v. Sumner, 105 F.3d 453, 456 (9th Cir. 1996). Unsurprising in light of
this comment, the jury was entirely white. Id. at 455.
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habeas attorneys informed the prosecutor that the comment would be in-
cluded as a ground for habeas relief, the prosecutor replied, "I did a good
job of that, didn't I?' ' 1 5 The Ninth Circuit found that the statements, if true,
were serious and would have bolstered Nevius's earlier claim of racial dis-
crimination in jury selection.'46 However, the court ruled that because the
statements were outside the record and never presented to a state court for
adjudication, they could not be considered.'47
c. Thompson v. State
Gregory Thompson was convicted of first-degree murder and sen-
tenced to death in Tennessee. He alleged that his attorney was ineffective
for failing to question the prosecutor about racist remarks during the motion
for a new trial, which Thompson asserted would have bolstered his claim of
jury selection discrimination.'48 At the state post-conviction hearing, one of
Thompson's attorneys testified that during a conversation with the prosecu-
tor occurring between voir dire and a motion for new trial, 4 9 the prosecutor
stated, "'I hope they fry that nigger."" 5 His co-counsel testified that, alt-
hough he did not hear the comment, he recalled seeing his colleague upset
after the conversation at issue. 5 ' The prosecutor denied making the racist
remark, and the trial judge ruled in favor of the prosecution, finding "that
the racist comment had not, in fact, been made."'52 Because of the deference
given to the state court's determinations of credibility, the Court of Criminal
Appeals of Tennessee denied relief.'53
5. Epithets by Judges
We did not find any criminal cases in the last twenty years in which
judges were alleged to have used racial slurs, though we did stumble upon
three disciplinary actions involving such a slur, and had we set out to find
such actions, we expect we would have found more. In 2008, the South
Carolina Supreme Court upheld the conclusions of a panel of the Commis-
145. Id. at 456 n.4.
146. Id. at 456.
147. Id.
148. Thompson v. State, 958 S.W.2d 156, 168 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).
149. The motion for new trial was based on the trial court's "refus[al] to enjoin the
state from using peremptory challenges to exclude any African Americans." Id. Defense
counsel sought the injunction after the prosecutor moved to strike the only African-American
prospective juror; the court allowed the challenge, based on the proffered reason that the
juror "was not strongly in favor of the death penalty." Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
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sion on Judicial Conduct, which found that a magistrate judge violated mul-
tiple Canons under Rule 7(a) of the Rules of Judicial Disciplinary Enforce-
ment when he, in a conversation with his clerk's supervisor, complained
that the clerk was dating 'niggers' and that there was 'no telling what we
might catch using the same bathroom as her."" 54 In 1998 the Michigan Su-
preme Court ordered removal of trial court judge based upon his repeated
use of "nigger" in surreptitiously recorded conversations off the bench,
which did not concern legal matters before the judge.' And in 1994, the
Arizona Supreme Court suspended a judge without pay for using the phrase
"'fucking niggers' in reference to post-conviction relief proceedings. 56
C. Earlier Cases
Although the focus of this Article is recent cases involving racial epi-
thets, we also wanted to check whether the numbers of such cases is declin-
ing, and whether there is any increase in the tendency to grant relief. The
short answer is, with one exception, things are not getting better. If one
compares the first decade of this century and the last decade of the twentieth
century, the frequency of reported racial slurs cases has slightly increased.
Moreover, the rate of reversal is slightly higher in the earlier decade.'
D. The Likelihood of Substantial Underestimation
For numerous reasons, we are convinced that the reported cases sub-
stantially underestimate the frequency with which trial participants use ra-
cial epithets. First, because of our involvement in the community of capital
154. In re Hutchings, 661 S.E.2d 343, 345 (S.C. 2008).
155. In re Ferrara, 582 N.W.2d 817, 819, 827 (Mich. 1998).
156. See In re Goodfarb, 880 P.2d 620, 621 (Ariz. 1994).
157. Thus, as previously mentioned, in the only case involving defense counsel epi-
thets, a habeas petitioner was granted an evidentiary hearing on his ineffective assistance
claim based on counsel's use of a racial slur, for which prejudice was presumed. See Frazer
v. United States, 18 F.3d 778, 780 (9th Cir. 1994) (reversing for appointment of new counsel
where trial counsel called his client "a stupid nigger son of a bitch" and promised to be inef-
fective if Frazer did not take a plea deal). We found three earlier cases involving use of racial
epithets by jurors. In one case, evidence of a juror's use of an ethnic slur was the basis for a
new trial. See State v. Santiago, 715 A.2d 1, 14, 22 (Conn. 1998) (remanding for a hearing on
juror misconduct where a juror called defendant "spic"). Of the two losing cases, one was
dismissed on procedural grounds, State v. Saleem, 977 P.2d 921, 928-29 (Kan. 1999) (affirm-
ing defendant's conviction where jurors used the term "nigger" because objection was not
made prior to the jury's verdict), and one was an unusual set of facts where the juror mis-
quoted testimony, replacing "black boys" with the obvious racial epithet, but immediately
recognized her "mistake" and covering her mouth. See State v. Hunter, 463 S.E.2d 314, 315-
17 (S.C. 1995) (denying relief where juror used the term "nigger" in reference to testimony
during trial). Moreover, the reference was not to the defendant. Id. Both of these facts were
relied upon by the state court in affirming the conviction. Id.
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appeals attorneys, we know of cases involving racial epithets that were chal-
lenged in a criminal case-but where the use of those epithets never finds
its way into a reported opinion. For example, one of us was counsel for
Louis Truesdale, where no published opinion reveals that the only black
juror told an investigator that fellow jurors intimidated her into voting for
the death penalty, and that two "young white male jurors . . . made remarks
such as this nigger has to fry."' 58 Similarly, the clemency investigation in
Curtis Osborne's case revealed two other cases-also unreported-in which
Osborne's lawyer had been accused in open court of calling his client a
"nigger"-and did not deny that he had done so, but claimed he did not re-
member if he had or had not.'59
Moreover, even in cases where the issue results in a reported opinion,
the phrasing of the opinion may neither report the language that was used,
nor use the words epithet or slur to describe that language, making them
very difficult to locate. 6 ' Mayfield and Rouse suggest that this may be a
large source of underinclusiveness, particularly of cases that deny relief. In
Mayfield v. Woodford, only dissenting Judge Graber identified the language
at issue;'6' the majority opinion, although identifying the slurs as "racial
epithets," did not even allude to what was actually said.'62 Likewise, in
Rouse v. Lee, had it not been for the vehement dissent of Judge Motz, the
juror's use of a racial epithet could not have been discerned from the opin-
ion.'63 Where there is no dissent, there may be no report of the language
actually at stake.
The vast overrepresentation of capital cases in our pool also suggests
that there may be many more unreported noncapital epithet cases. That the
use of epithets would be more frequently litigated-though not necessarily
more frequently occurring-is likely both because capital cases tend to be
158. Information About Persons Executed 1998, FIGHT THE DEATH PENALTY USA,
http://www.fdp.dk/uk/exec/exe-9804.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2011).
159. DeathPenaltylnfoCntr, Georgia Execution Involves Racially Biased and Unpre-
pared Defense Lawyer, YoUTUBE (Mar. 13, 2009), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v =
d I Kk7dwEcAQ.
160. A related difficulty is one of winnowing the cases that in fact contain a racial
epithet, since many of those cases do not actually involve the independent use of the epithet
by a juror, lawyer, judge, or witness, but merely the recounting of someone else's extra-
judicial use of that epithet.
161. Mayfield v. Woodford, 270 F.3d 915, 939-40 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (Graber,
J., dissenting). The dissent also elaborated about the statement of the bigoted attorney's own
daughter-which the majority does not mention-that her father "especially ridiculed black
people, referring to them... [by] terms and phrases [such] as 'nigger,' 'schwartze,' 'jig,'
'jungle bunnies,' 'trigger the nigger,' and 'shoot the coon to the moon."' Id.
162. See id. at 924-25 (majority opinion).
163. See 339 F.3d 238, 257-58 (4th Cir. 2003).
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better funded, and hence better investigated and better litigated,"6 and be-
cause the use of epithets in such cases is more likely to gamer public atten-
tion.
Finally, while we might not be surprised that the use of racial epithets
to describe African Americans is more common than the use of racial epi-
thets to describe other groups, we note that our pool of twenty-first century
cases contains no epithets at all for other races or ethnicities. This too sug-
gests that we are missing cases, or put differently, that some cases are re-
ported in ways that are not easily locatable.'65
II. THE GOVERNING LEGAL STANDARDS
Even a cursory examination of the governing legal standards makes it
apparent why so many cases lose, although it also makes clear that there are
doctrinal choices to be made, and that these losses are not foreordained.
A. Juror Misconduct
We begin with juror misconduct, both because the largest number of
epithet cases involve jurors and because there is such a sharp division in
approaches to epithets in this context. The Sixth Amendment guarantees a
criminal defendant "a fair trial by a panel of impartial, 'indifferent' ju-
rors."'66 This guarantee, however, is often in tension with the long-standing
rule that prevents the court from considering evidence that impeaches the
jury's verdict.'67 Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b), and its state counterparts,
codify that longstanding rule:
Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify
as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations
or to the effect of anything upon his or any other juror's mind or emotions as influ-
encing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning his
mental processes in connection therewith, except that a juror may testify on the
question whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the
jury's attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear
upon any juror. Nor may his affidavit or evidence of any statement by him con-
cerning a matter about which he would be precluded from testifying be received
for these purposes.'
68
164. See generally John H. Blume, Sheri Lynn Johnson & Keir M. Weyble, In De-
fense of Noncapital Habeas: A Response to Hoffman and King, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 435
(2011).
165. An earlier case, Ex parte Guzmon, 730 S.W.2d 724 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) was
reversed due to defense counsel's reference to his client during voir dire as a 'wet-back."'
166. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961).
167. See, e.g., McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267-68 (1915).
168. FED. R. EVID. 606(b).
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If a court adheres to a rigid version of the no-impeachment rule, it is
theoretically possible to grant relief based upon a juror's utterance of racial
epithets, but only because the use of an epithet raises the question of wheth-
er the juror lied on voir dire. Then the issue becomes whether the defendant
can show "that a juror failed to answer honestly a material question on voir
dire, and then further show that a correct response would have provided a
valid basis for a challenge for cause."'69 This standard probably could have
been met in Rouse, had the Fourth Circuit been willing to hear Rouse's
claim on the merits because the juror in question not only used a racial epi-
thet, but told other jurors that he lied to get on the jury. But such situations
are rare, in part because such boasting is risky, but mostly because the racial
epithet does not come from a juror who lied to get on the jury. Actually, in
many noncapital cases, there would have been no opportunity to lie, because
no question about racial bias was asked. The Supreme Court has refused to
find a due process right to such a question in noncapital cases, even when
the crime is an interracial one. 7° Moreover, if a juror is asked a question,
and then lies about his or her racial bias, it would far more likely be due to
shame or the awareness of social disapproval of such bias-and such lies
would hardly be the subject of boasting. And finally, "lying" in the sense of
deliberately deceiving is just not the point; a juror may in good faith think
that he is not racially biased but still use racial epithets. The question should
not be whether he thinks he is biased, but whether the epithet reveals that he
is biased. Resolving that question, as did the lower court in Bennett, by rely-
ing upon the epithet-employing juror's assertions that he is not racially bi-
ased is leaving the fox to guard the henhouse, or, more aptly, the slave mas-
ter to determine the aptitude of the slave.
Because of the tension between the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a
"fair trial by a panel of impartial, 'indifferent' jurors"'' and the no-
impeachment rule, and the unsatisfactoriness of resolving this tension by
cabining relief for juror lies about bias, some lower courts have questioned
whether the no-impeachment rule should apply to evidence that racial bias
has tainted jury deliberations. One means of doing so is to interpret racial
bias as an "external influence" that therefore lies within the exception to
Rule 606(b) "that a juror may testify on the question whether extraneous
prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or
whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any
169. McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 556 (1984).
170. See Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28 (1986) (holding that a capital defendant
accused of an interracial crime is entitled to question potential jurors about racial bias, but
adhering to prior precedent that noncapital defendants are not).
171. Irwin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961).
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juror."'72 Several cases from the 1970s adopted this position,'73 but it does
run the risk of swallowing the rule.
Florida case law has crafted a line that attempts to preserve the rule
while permitting inquiry into racist statements:
[Ijt would be improper, after a verdict is rendered, to individually inquire into the
thought processes of a juror to seek to discover some bias in the juror's mind, like
the racial bias involved here, as a possible motivation for that particular juror to...
act as she did. Those innermost thoughts, good and bad, truly inhere in the verdict.
But when appeals to racial bias are made openly among the jurors, they constitute
overt acts of misconduct. This is one way that we attempt to draw a bright line.
This line may not keep improper bias from being a silent factor with a particular
juror, but, hopefully, it will act as a check on such bias and prevent the bias from
being expressed so as to overtly influence others.'
74
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
The typical means for assessing a defendant's Sixth Amendment claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel is set forth in Strickland v. Washing-
ton.'75 Under Strickland, a defendant's right is violated when counsel pro-
vides deficient representation that results in prejudice. The first Strickland
inquiry-the performance prong-requires "that counsel's representation
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" under the prevailing
professional norms. 176 On review, there is "a strong presumption that coun-
sel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assis-
tance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the
circumstances, the challenged action 'might be considered sound trial strat-
egy.""' 17  The second' requirement-the prejudice prong-requires a de-
fendant to show "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofes-
sional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.' ' 79
As the Court noted in Strickland, the standard for ineffectiveness is
highly deferential, and the prejudice prong is especially difficult to prove in
172. Smith v. Brewer, 444 F. Supp. 482, 490 (S.D. Iowa 1978).
173. See, e.g., Smith, 444 F. Supp. at 490; Tobias v. Smith, 468 F. Supp. 1287, 1289
(W.D.N.Y. 1979); see also United States v. Henley, 238 F.3d 1111, 1121 (9th Cir. 2001)
(remanding for an evidentiary hearing on claims of juror bias while explicitly holding open
the question of whether racist statements fit within any exception to the rule).
174. Marshall v. State, 854 So. 2d 1235, 1241 (Fla. 2003) (emphasis in original).
175. 466 U.S. 668 (1994).
176. Id. at 688.
177. Id. at 689 (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)).
178. Although this prong is designated as the second, a court may review an ineffec-
tive-assistance claim in either order it wants and may dispose of the claim on either prong
without discussing the other. See id. at 697.
179. Id. at 694. The Court further defined a reasonable probability as "a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id.
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practice. 8° A defendant must show that the "[l]ikelihood of a different result
[is] substantial, not just conceivable."'' Notably, every court that has ap-
plied Strickland to a case involving a racial epithet by counsel has denied
relief, the one grant of relief came in Frazer, where the court presumed
prejudice from counsel's use of an epithet.
A second approach to the use of racial epithets by defense counsel is
through the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Accord-
ing to the Eleventh Circuit, racially biased decision making by defense
counsel would not constitute an Equal Protection violation because
"McCleskey discusses the racial animus of the decisionmakers, not defense
counsel."'82 This reasoning is simply wrong. While it may be true that the
statistical evidence considered in McCleskey focused on discrimination by
prosecutors and juries, McCleskey itself purports to apply broader basic
Equal Protection principles. Those principles include a prohibition against
race-based discrimination by any state actor, absent a compelling state in-
terest and the necessity of using the classification to further that interest.'83
At least when acting in a criminal trial, defense counsel is a state actor sub-
ject to the constraints of the Equal Protection Clause.8 4 Moreover, it takes
only a small thought experiment to conclude that the Eleventh Circuit's
categorical rejection of an Equal Protection claim based on defense coun-
sel's racial bias must be erroneous: Is it plausible that an attorney appointed
by the state (as almost all defense attorneys are) who declared that he would
spend twice as much time on the cases of white defendants as on the cases
of similarly charged black defendants would not be violating the Equal Pro-
tection Clause?
C. Prosecutorial Misconduct
At least three different legal claims might be created or impacted by a
prosecutor's use of a racial epithet. The most obvious claim generated by
the use of a racial slur is one of selective prosecution: that the prosecutor
used his discretion in a racially biased way, either in choosing to prosecute,
or in choosing to seek death. This claim arises from the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and is governed by the standards
identified in United States v. Arnstrong'85 and McCleskey v. Kemp. In Arm-
180. When a federal court considers a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel in
conjunction with the deference due to state court decisions under AEDPA, the result is a
doubly deferential standard that is even less likely to warrant relief. See Harrington v. Rich-
ter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 788 (2011).
181. See id at 792 (emphasis added).
182, Osborne v. Terry, 476 F. 3d 1299, 1318 (11 th Cir. 2006).
183. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 212-31, 235-39 (1995).
184. Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992).
185. 517 U.S. 456 (1996).
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strong, the Court required a defendant claiming selective prosecution to
show "that the administration of a criminal law is 'directed so exclusively
against a particular class of persons.., with a mind so unequal and oppres-
sive' that the system of prosecution amounts to 'a practical denial' of equal
protection of the law."' 86 In McCleskey, as has been discussed throughout
this Symposium, the Court required that a defendant show that racial dis-
crimination affected the outcome in his own case, and deemed even strong
statistical evidence to be insufficient evidence to establish the required
causal link.'87 Given that only one post-McCleskey capital sentencing race
discrimination case has succeeded in the twenty-five years since McCleskey,
it is obvious that this is a difficult standard to meet.'88
In Darden v. Wainwright,'89 the Supreme Court set forth another
standard relevant to a prosecutor's use of a racial epithet: when prejudicial
prosecutorial arguments violate a defendant's Due Process right to a fair
trial. The Court held that "[t]he relevant question is whether the prosecu-
tors' comments 'so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting
conviction a denial of due process.' "' Although this standard seems vague,
the Court provided some elaboration about the relevant factors to consider,
albeit not with any suggestion for the appropriate weighting of those factors.
First, a reviewing court must look to what the prosecutor actually said. A
comment that manipulates or misstates evidence, or that implicates "other
specific rights of the accused," for example, will likely be seen as more de-
serving of reversal than truthful commentary that is inappropriately stated.' 9
In addition, a court should look to the relevant, related conduct by defense
counsel. If it appears that defense counsel "'invited' the prosecutors com-
ment through his own inflammatory conduct, a court will be less likely to
award relief.' Furthermore, the court must look to the trial court's instruc-
tions that may have mitigated the inappropriate prosecutorial comment.'93
The last consideration is the weight of the evidence against defendant to
determine the effect of the comment on the trial as a whole."' The facts of
Darden suggest the difficulty of prevailing under its standard. The improper
arguments made during the penalty phase of Darden's trial were neither
isolated nor brief, and they were extremely inflammatory, yet the Supreme
186. Id. at 464-65 (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373 (1886)).
187. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
188. See Johnson, supra note 108, at 179-80 (discussing single winning case).
189. 477 U.S. 168 (1986).
190. Id. at 181 (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637 (1974)).
191. Seeid. at 181-82.
192. See id at 182.
193. See id
194. See id.
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Court declined to reverse, relying in large part on the overwhelming evi-
dence against Darden.'95
Finally, Batson v. Kentucky196 holds that the Equal Protection Clause
precludes a prosecutor from exercising his or her peremptory challenge on
the basis of race, and a prosecutor's use of a racial epithet could be proba-
tive of his racial motivation in striking a minority race juror.' Batson
claims, like selective prosecution claims, require a showing of purposeful
discrimination in which the ultimate burden of proof of that motivation falls
on the defendant and consequently are difficult to win.'98 The smoking gun
of a racial epithet eases that burden considerably, and the pressure of Batson
claims may be part of the reason that reported cases involving the use of
racial epithets by prosecutors have become rarer than such cases involving
defense attorneys.
1li. TOWARD ERADICATION OF EPITHETS
Having read our summaries of the epithet cases, we hope the reader
will agree that current law, while it provides vehicles with the potential for
remedying and deterring the use of racial epithets, generally has failed to do
so. Below, we propose a per se approach and then defend it against likely
objections.
A. Our Proposal
When a (1) decisionmaker in a (2) criminal case uses a (3) racial epi-
thet to address, describe, or refer to (4) the defendant, or in the case of a
lawyer, other defendants he or she contemporaneously represented or pros-
ecuted, and the defendant raises the resulting claim at (5) the first oppor-
tunity after he discovers the use of the epithet, the defendant's (6) conviction
should be reversed.
1. Decisionmakers
By "decisionmaker," we include jurors, defense lawyers, prosecutors,
and judges. The power and discretion inherent in the roles of juror, defense
lawyer, and prosecutor is obvious. It is true that a judge's decision making,
except in bench trials, is more limited, but it is important enough that "the
floor established by the Due Process Clause clearly requires a 'fair trial in a
195. See id. at 185-87.
196. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
197. Id. at 79-80.
198. Id.
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fair tribunal,' before a judge with no actual bias against the defendant or
interest in the outcome of his particular case."'"
We do not, however, include use of racial epithets by witnesses, even
when those epithets are heard by the jury and are contemporary characteri-
zations rather than quotations of out-of-court statements. This is not to say
that courts should not be concerned when jurors are exposed to racial epi-
thets, from whatever source. Thus, should a witness (or courtroom observer,
for that matter) use a racial epithet in the jury's presence before trial begins,
as occurred in Robinson v. State,2" it would seem appropriate to dismiss the
jury pool and start anew. But where a witness uses an epithet later in the
case, admonishment of the jurors may be sufficient. Indeed, some admoni-
tion would be appropriate even if the witness were repeating an out-of-court
statement relevant to the issues at trial.2"' These precautions are appropriate
because use of a racial epithet may trigger stereotyping and animosity in
decisionmakers, but because use of an epithet by some participant who
makes no decisions does not demonstrate bias that infects the trial process,
it should not result in automatic reversal."2
2. Criminal Cases
The progressive Florida rule, which permits inquiry into the racial bias
of jurors when that bias was expressed during deliberations, actually had its
origins in a civil case.03 We certainly do not dispute that reversal would be
appropriate in similar circumstances in a civil case, but none of us feel we
have the expertise to evaluate the somewhat different trade-offs that arise on
the civil side. However, we do mean to encompass the use of epithets in the
appellate, post-conviction, and federal habeas stages of a criminal case, de-
spite the fact that some of those stages are technically civil. Post-conviction
judges, post-conviction counsel, and assistant attorneys general have the
same kind of decision-making power and discretion that their counterparts
have at trial, and therefore, a parallel response is required. A parallel re-
sponse, however, would not normally entail a new trial but would entail a
199. Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904 (1997) (internal citations omitted).
200. 214 S.W.3d 840, 842 (Ark. 2005).
201. In many instances, where the use of the epithet is probative of any issue the jury
needs to determine, it would be appropriate to instruct the witness to avoid repeating the
epithet.
202. Use of an epithet by a bailiff, or other court personnel, is a closer question. In
most situations, these individuals have no particular influence over a decisionmaker. Howev-
er, if such influence were present in a particular case-for example, if a bailiff spoke of the
defendant in that manner to jurors during deliberations-then we are inclined to think auto-
matic reversal is appropriate. This is also more practical than a rule that would encompass
witnesses and observers, who generally cannot be trained or deterred as can court personnel.
203. Powell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 652 So. 2d 354 (Fla. 1995).
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repeat of the proceeding in which the person who spoke the epithet partici-
pated-with that person being recused from participation in the new pro-
ceeding, of course.
We also want to explicitly disavow the strange compromise made by
the Supreme Court in the related area of voir dire. Turner v. Murray" holds
that a capital defendant-but only a capital defendant-accused of an inter-
racial crime is entitled to question potential jurors about racial bias. This
distinction between capital and noncapital cases is warranted, according to
the Turner majority, because a capital sentencing proceeding has both high-
er stakes and a greater opportunity for discretion than does the determina-
tion of guilt. We think that such a distinction is unwarranted there-and
here-for exactly the reasons the dissent articulates:
A trial to determine guilt or innocence is, at bottom, nothing more than the sum to-
tal of a countless number of small discretionary decisions made by each individual
who sits in the jury box. The difference between conviction and acquittal turns on
whether key testimony is believed or rejected; on whether an alibi sounds plausible
or dubious; on whether a character witness appears trustworthy or unsavory; and
on whether the jury concludes that the defendant had a motive, the inclination, or
the means available to commit the crime charged. A racially biased juror sits with
blurred vision and impaired sensibilities and is incapable of fairly making the myr-
iad decisions that each juror is called upon to make in the course of a trial. To put it
simply, he cannot judge because he has prejudged. This is equally true at the trial
on guilt as at the hearing on sentencing.
20 5
Moreover, the distinction proposed by the majority has even less va-
lidity in the context of a decisionmaker who has used a racial epithet, for
clearly, if he or she has used that language, bias has been triggered by the
proceedings in which he or she is involved, whether capital or noncapital.
3. Racial Epithets/Ethnic Slurs
There is both a definitional issue raised by "racial epithets" and a line-
drawing issue. We postpone for the following section, in which we answer
objections, why racial epithets should be treated differently than other indi-
cations of bias. With respect to the definitional question, we use "racial epi-
thets" interchangeably with "ethnic slurs"--or, more technically,
"ethnophaulisms"-both because the Constitution treats discrimination on
the basis of ethnic origin the same way it treats race2 and because ethnic
slurs function to degrade in the same way that racial slurs do. By that cate-
gory we mean to include all terms or words used to insult, derogate, or pejo-
204. 476 U.S. 28 (1986).
205. Id. at 42-43 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
206. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (applying strict scru-
tiny to the "racial classification" of Japanese ancestry).
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ratively describe a person on the basis of his or her race, ethnicity, or na-
tionality. Moreover, religious slurs usually, though not always, reflect simi-
lar animosity and degradation, and when they do, should be treated the same
as are racial slurs.
Perusing a list of such slurs is demoralizing, for there are so many, and
such varied, entries in those lists. For example, Wikipedia lists four slurs
against African Americans that begin with the letter A: "alligator bait,"
which refers to an African-American child; "Ann," a black woman who
thinks she should be treated like a white woman; "ape," and "Aunt Jemi-
ma," a black woman who ingratiates herself with white people." 7
Even though long, lists of slurs cannot be viewed as exhaustive. In
part, this is because there are idiosyncratic variations on slurs that are not
captured in lists but function exactly as does the more prevalent form; thus,
for example, calling a black defendant "King Kong," as did the prosecutor
in Johnny Bennett's case, is really no different than calling him "ape."
Moreover, there are combinations of an ethnic descriptor, not a slur in itself,
with another derogatory term that by itself does not reference ethnicity, and
these combinations will not appear on ethnic slur lists simply because there
are so many possibilities. Thus, for example, the Wikipedia list does not
include "dirty Jew" or "stinking Arab," but any sensible approach would
incorporate these into the category of racial epithets/ethnic slurs.
4. The Subject of the Epithet
In almost all of the cases we have surveyed, the subject of the epithet
is a criminal defendant. One can imagine a rule that would encompass any
use of a racial epithet concerning any person at any time-a rule that would
be extraordinarily broad. But such a rule would encompass a minority juror
who had used an epithet toward a person of his or her own group in a social
setting, as well as an elderly juror who had used an epithet at a time when it
was not nearly as clearly indicative of bias as it is today, or a juror who had
used the epithet to describe a person of a group to which the defendant does
not belong-and all of those applications reach beyond the focus of our
concern. In general, unless the epithet is used to describe a criminal defend-
ant, it should not trigger per se reversal. Of course, there are some situations
in which the use of a racial slur toward someone other than a defendant
triggers virtually the same concerns as does its use toward a defendant. If, as
in Pace v. State, a juror used a racial slur to disparage the testimony of an
African-American defense witness, and the defendant was also African-
207. List of Ethnic Slurs, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List-of ethnic
slurs (last visited Oct. 21, 2011).
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American, 208 then a reviewing court should treat the epithet in the same way
that it would had it been directed against the defendant-because it is likely
that the juror in question will be as biased in his evaluation of the defendant
as in his evaluation of the witness.
We think any distinction as to the addressee of the racial epithet, such
as that made by the Eleventh Circuit in Jones v. Campbell,2°9 is irrelevant.
Whether or not the defendant heard the slur and was wounded or angered-
or even indifferent due to having heard it so often-is not the point; the
point is whether or not the decisionmaker has exhibited an intensity of bias
that cannot be squared with race-neutral decision making.
We also reject a qualification that, as suggested to be important by the
Bennett court, an epithet describing or denigrating the defendant have been
uttered during the course of the trial itself. It is simply implausible-at least,
absent extraordinary circumstances-to assume that racial bias against a
particular defendant was generated after the trial concluded. It is implausi-
ble both because racial bias, at least in the general population, is decreasing
over time, and it is implausible because the bias against the defendant in
particular is more likely to have been stirred by testimony concerning his
alleged crimes than by the passage of time. Perhaps it should be open to a
court to consider an unusual case where some traumatic, posttrial, racially
charged incident has in fact created a new racial bias in the juror, lawyer, or
judge who later uses the epithet-if such a case ever occurs.
We have incorporated into our proposal that when a defense lawyer or
a prosecutor directs a racial or ethnic slur at or about "other defendants he
or she contemporaneously represented or prosecuted' such a slur is treated
the same way as is a slur against the defendant. This is primarily because of
the great likelihood that a lawyer who has so denigrated one criminal de-
fendant is likely to have done so with respect to other criminal defendants of
the same race that he or she is contemporaneously representing-as was the
case with respect to the defense attorney whose epithets were challenged in
Ellis and Mayfield. Moreover, even if the lawyer has not made such a re-
mark about a particular defendant, referring to any client or accused by a
racial slur is such a gross deviation from professional standards that it
demonstrates strength of bias that should be presumed to affect actions tak-
en with respect to other clients of the same race."'
208. Pace v. State, 904 So. 2d 331, 342 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004) ("I don't believe a
word those niggers said.").
209. 436 F.3d 1285, 1304-05 (1Ith Cir. 2006).
210. The North Carolina Supreme Court ordered the removal of a district attorney
from office because the attorney, while at a bar, "loudly and repeatedly" called a fellow
patron a "nigger." In re Spivey, 480 S.E.2d 693 (N.C. 1997). While we agree with the disci-
pline, we would not reverse convictions of African-American defendants obtained by such a
prosecutor because the circumstances-including the influence of alcohol-are so different
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5. The First Opportunity
Doctrines of procedural default, for better or worse, are a substantial
barrier to redress of many serious constitutional violations."' We pause here
only to note that in racial epithet cases, some lower courts have imposed
roadblocks beyond what such doctrines require. If a defendant raises a claim
involving the use of a racial epithet by a decisionmaker in his trial promptly
upon learning of the underlying facts, no procedural default has occurred.
The Supreme Court's approach in Williams v. Taylor,"' is controlling here.
In Williams, a juror failed to reveal her relationship to a key state wit-
ness, as well as her prior representation by the state's attorney, despite the
fact that she was asked about such relationships during voir dire."m 3 After
both the trial and state post-conviction proceedings were over, attorneys for
Williams discovered these relationships." 4 The Supreme Court found that
given the nature of the facts withheld by the juror, Williams had not "failed
to develop" his claim in state court, and the surrounding circumstances "suf-
fice to establish cause for any procedural default petitioner may have com-
mitted in not presenting these claims to the [state] courts in the first in-
stance." ' 5 Just as the Supreme Court determined that it would have been
unreasonable to expect post-conviction counsel to check the public records
to determine whether the juror had previously been married to a witness or
previously represented by the state's attorney," 6 it would be unreasonable to
expect that post-conviction counsel in every case would investigate whether
jurors, defense counsel, or the prosecutor had used racial slurs against cli-
ents. Such events are rare enough that "diligent counsel" cannot be expected
to expend time and resources investigating them, and consequently, when
they come to light later, procedural default must be deemed to have a
"cause" that excuses it.2m7 That said, there may be some instances, such as
that described in Ellis, where a defendant learns of the use of an epithet and
then delays acting on that information for a substantial period of time; here,
unlike Osborne, the case with which we began this Article, a finding of de-
fault is appropriate.
that we think an inference of likely discrimination against criminal defendants is not strong
enough to warrant blanket reversals.
211. Although we think that the modem, very harsh forms of such doctrines are unde-
sirable, see Blume, Johnson & Weyble, supra note 164, at 472-73, we incorporate current
procedural default principals in our proposal here.
212. 529 U.S. 420 (2000).
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at444.
216. Id. at443.
217. Id.
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B. Answering Objections
Obviously we have delayed addressing the central question of just
how concerned courts should be when a decisionmaker in a criminal case
uses a racial epithet to describe or denigrate a criminal defendant. We have
hoped that the reader's knowledge of history, understanding of psychology,
and commitment to racial justice provides most of the answer to this ques-
tion, but we sketch below the reasons we think epithets deserve a special
rule, then explain why we think no inquiry into the "effects" of an epithet on
the decisionmaker is appropriate.
1. Why a Special Rule for Epithets?
The Sixth Amendment, of course, "requires that a defendant have 'a
panel of impartial, "indifferent" jurors." 2 8 Given the history of the discrim-
inatory treatment against black defendants in the criminal justice system, it
cannot be seriously disputed that "racial prejudice can violently affect a
juror's impartiality [in a criminal case] . 219 Despite this history and the
magnitude of the risk, we do not here urge automatic reversal upon any evi-
dence of any form or racial stereotyping or imagery. Why not?.22
We start with the worst epithet, which at least in the reported cases, is
overwhelmingly the most common. "No word in the English language is as
odious or loaded with as terrible a history [as nigger].22' Not only is the use
of the term 'highly offensive and demeaning,' . . . it evok[es] a history of
racial violence, brutality, and subordination." ' That history, in many states,
includes slavery, post-reconstruction lynchings, and extraordinarily violent
resistance to integration.223
It is true that current literature shows that many-indeed most-
whites harbor automatic, often unconscious, racial associations and stereo-
types. 24 The past has trained most Americans to make those associations,
218. Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 799 (1975) (quoting Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S.
717, 722 (1961)).
219. United States ex rel. Haynes v. McKendrick, 481 F.2d 152, 157 (2d Cir. 1973).
220. One of us has urged that elsewhere, see Sheri Lynn Johnson, Racial Imagery in
Criminal Cases, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1739 (1993), but is constrained in this Article by her co-
authors, as well as by the hope of influencing the law.
221. Daso v. Grafton Sch., Inc., 181 F. Supp. 2d 485,493 (D. Md. 2002).
222. McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1116 (9th Cir. 2004).
223. See, e.g., South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 315-37 (1966).
224. On tests of implicit attitudes, the vast majority of white Americans express a
strong preference for whites. See, e.g., Brian Nosek, et al., Harvesting Implicit Group Atti-
tudes from a Demonstration Web Site, 6 GROUP DYNAMICS 101, 105 (2002) (reporting data).
Most white adults are also more likely to shoot a black target than a white target in a video
simulation-regardless of whether the object the target pulls out of his pocket is a tool or a
gun. Results on this task correlate with measures of implicit attitudes. Jack Glaser & Eric D.
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and consequently, they may bear no moral responsibility for them. But per-
sons with those automatic associations sometimes can, if motivated, sup-
press those biases, and make unbiased decisions."2 5 Where a decisionmaker
has used a racial epithet-whether the most offensive epithet or a slightly
less horrible slur-to describe or demean a criminal defendant, the problem
of a well-meaning but subconsciously biased juror is not at stake. The use of
the words at issue here-particularly the use of the most disparaging word
in the English language, but more generally, the use of words the degrade
and dehumanize based on ancestry--do not reflect a person with mild or
subconscious associations, but an extremist: someone who actively accepts
stereotypes and racial animosity.226 The law can, and must, repudiate deci-
sions made by such decisionmakers, both for the sake of the defendant, and
for the sake of the community that rests its trust in the judicial system.
2. Why No Inquiry into the Meaning or Effect of the Epithet?
This question repeats, in a different form, doubt about the significance
of a racial epithet. The South Carolina Supreme Court will soon face pre-
cisely that question in the petition for certiorari of Johnny Bennett. The
reader will recall that a juror from Bennett's capital trial opined that the
reason behind Bennett's crime was that Bennett was "just a dumb nigger." '227
According to the post-conviction relief court, that statement was not a rea-
son to reverse Bennett's conviction or sentence, in part because the court
credited the juror's assurances "that his decision was based solely on the
evidence presented at trial"; "that race had nothing to do with his decision";
and "that he did not believe that Blacks are inferior to Whites. '"28
But this is not really a credibility determination, or if it is one, it is
misguided. The Supreme Court of the United States, when confronted with
a similar finding of fact in a case of another species of juror bias, made clear
that some juror protestations of impartiality must be taken with more than a
grain of salt: "No doubt each juror was sincere when he said that he would
Knowles, Implicit Motivation to Control Prejudice, 44 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 164
(2008).
225. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?,
84 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1195, 1202-04, 1221 (2009) (reviewing the literature and reporting
new data).
226. Since at least the 1970s, the number of "dominative racists"--those who em-
brace white superiority racial stereotypes and animosity-has been steadily falling. See, e.g.,
HOWARD SCHUMAN ET AL., RACIAL ATTITUDES IN AMERICA (1985); Howard Schuman,
Changing Racial Norms in America, 30 MICH. Q. REv. 460 (1991).
227. Transcript of Record at 9, Bennett v. State, No. 06-CP-40-5751 (S.C. Ct. Com.
P1. 2008).
228. Amended Order at 41, Bennett v. State, No. 06-CP-32-3221 (S.C. Ct. Com. Pl.
2009).
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be fair and impartial to petitioner, but the psychological impact requiring
such a declaration before one's fellows is often its father.
229
The Eleventh Circuit in Osborne raised parallel objections to Os-
borne's claim concerning his trial counsel's statement that "that little nigger
deserves the chair," questioning whether the epithet established racial ani-
mosity, and holding that it did not constitute evidence of discrimination.23 °
But in Bennett, as in Osborne, as in all epithet cases, it is simply inconceiv-
able that the speaker in fact did not believe that African Americans were
inferior to whites, or harbored no racial animosity towards them, or was
uninfluenced by race.' "Bias or prejudice is ... an elusive condition of the
mind . . . and it might exist in the mind of one ... who was quite positive
that he had no bias, and said that he was perfectly able to decide the ques-
tion wholly uninfluenced by anything but the evidence. '"232 Or, as the Ninth
Circuit put it, "We have considerable difficulty accepting the government's
assumption that, at this time in our history, people who use the word 'nig-
ger' are not racially biased.
233
Florida has adopted a per se rule of reversal for cases in which a ju-
ror's use of an epithet has been established.2 " A Louisiana appellate court,
in the absence of controlling Louisiana precedent, has adopted Florida's
approach, also abjuring additional inquiry into whether the use of an epithet
had an effect, quoting the reasoning of the Florida Supreme Court: "Any
attempt by the jurors to characterize their racially charged comments would
have no effect of erasing prejudice and bigotry so evident. 235
3. What About Rouse?
An objection to our proposal from the other side of the ideological
spectrum is possible: Nothing we have said would alter the travesty of
Rouse v. Lee. This is true, but we think not really a criticism of our pro-
posal. Rouse lost a claim that, on the merits, would seem to win in virtually
every jurisdiction: One of his jurors not only used a racial epithet to de-
scribe Rouse, but admitted to other jurors that he had lied during voir dire in
order to be seated on Rouse's jury. Rouse lost not because of the substantive
229. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 728 (1961).
230. Osborne v. Terry, 476 F.3d 1297, 1318 (11 th Cir. 2006) ("Osborne presents no
other evidence to support his claim that Mostiler's alleged racial animosity affected his rep-
resentation.").
231. See generally Johnson, supra note 108 (reviewing the literature on racial bias
and its influence on decision making).
232. Crawford v. United States, 212 U.S. 183, 196 (1909).
233. United States v. Henley, 238 F.3d 1111, 1121 (9th Cir. 2001).
234. Powell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 652 So.2d 354, 358 (Fla. 1995).
235. State v. Jones, 2009-075 1, p. 8 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2009); 29 So.3d 533, 539 (quot-
ing Wright v. CTL Distribution, Inc., 650 So. 2d 641, 643 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)).
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law governing his claim, but because a majority of the Fourth Circuit re-
fused to consider the merits of his claim at all-due to his attorney's error in
filing Rouse's petition one day after the statute of limitations period had
expired. Elsewhere we have deplored Rouse, and its rigid application of a
counterproductive statute of limitations.236 But that problem is different than
the one on which this Article focuses, and we note with some optimism that
as this Article is going to press, the Supreme Court is considering whether
attorney error may excuse procedural default,237 and should it decide that it
may, one can imagine a similar approach to statute of limitations barriers
when caused by attorney error, as was the case in Rouse.
CONCLUSION
Examination of modern racial epithet cases is not pleasant. Those cas-
es reveal the continued presence of race-based animosity and the absence, in
most jurisdictions, of any significant efforts to ameliorate its influence on
criminal cases. Indeed, we are reminded of Justice Scalia's memo on
McCleskey,238 in which he stated that even if he were persuaded that the data
proved purposeful discrimination, he would not strike down Warren
McCleskey's death sentence. That view, which seemed quite shocking when
first revealed, has real parallels here, for there can be--or at least, should
be-little doubt that when a trial participant uses a racial epithet, he or she
has engaged in purposeful discrimination. Yet most jurisdictions have found
reasons to do nothing, or at least to do nothing unless some value in addition
to racial equality-such as protecting the process from lying jurors-is at
stake.
Surprisingly, the greatest commitment to the eradication of overt bias
in jurors appears in the Florida and Louisiana cases, a commitment other
jurisdictions would do well to emulate. South Carolina has the opportunity
to do so imminently, and we hope that it will follow the implications of its
236. See Blume, Johnson & Weyble, supra note 164, at 479.
237. Maples v. Thomas, 131 S. Ct. 1718 (2011) (granting certiorari only with respect
to the second question of the petition, which reads: "Whether the Eleventh Circuit properly
held-in conflict with the decisions of this Court and other courts--that there was no 'cause'
to excuse any procedural default where petitioner was blameless for the default, the State's
own conduct contributed to the default, and petitioner's attorneys of record were no longer
functioning as his agents at the time of any default.").
238. See John H. Blume, Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, Post-
McKleskey Racial Discrimination Claims in Capital Cases, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1771, 1779
(1998); Dennis D. Dorin, Far Right of the Mainstream: Racism, Rights, and Remedies from
the Perspective of Justice Antonin Scalia's McCleskey Memorandum, 45 MERCER L. REV.
1035 (1994).
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earlier cases... and embrace Louisiana's per se rule when jurors refer to the
defendant with a racial epithet. In this Article we have modestly proposed to
extend that per se approach to the use of racial epithets by other trial
decisionmakers, noting that Equal Protection principles long espoused by
the Supreme Court would seem to command that extension.
Finally, we note that the racial progress of the last half-century makes
it reasonable for post-conviction lawyers and their clients to presume-
absent information to the contrary-that trial participants do not have the
kind of bias that leads them to direct racial epithets at defendants, much like
they presume-again, absent information to the contrary-that jurors will
not lie during voir dire. Thus, when the use of a racial epithet is credibly
alleged to have been discovered late in the litigation game, procedural de-
fault should be excused, and inquiry into the merits of the claim permitted.
A nation that has made some progress toward the goal of racial justice
should both acknowledge that progress and admit that the goal has not yet
been achieved. Rooting out the influence of racial epithets, whenever dis-
covered, is a necessary, albeit modest, step toward that goal.
239. See State v. Hunter, 463 S.E.2d 314, 316 (1995) (finding that "[t]he use of the
word 'nigger' by a juror was highly improper," but declining to reverse because "[the juror]
was not referring to [the black juror] or [to the defendant] when she made the statement").
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